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The use of unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) has been 
characterized as the next great step forward in the evolution of civil aviation.  Although use 
of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in military and public service operations is 
proliferating, civil use of UAS remains limited in the United States today.  This report 
focuses on one particular regulatory challenge: classifying UAS to assign airworthiness 
standards.  Classification is useful for ensuring that meaningful differences in design are 
accommodated by certification to different standards, and that aircraft with similar risk 
profiles are held to similar standards.  This paper provides observations related to how the 
current regulations for classifying manned aircraft, based on dimensions of aircraft class 
and operational aircraft categories, could apply to UAS.  This report finds that existing 
aircraft classes are well aligned with the types of UAS that currently exist; however, the 
operational categories are more difficult to align to proposed UAS use in the NAS.  
Specifically, the factors used to group manned aircraft into similar risk profiles do not 
necessarily capture all relevant UAS risks.  UAS classification is investigated through 
gathering approaches to classification from a broad spectrum of organizations, and then 
identifying and evaluating the classification factors from these approaches.  This initial 
investigation concludes that factors in addition to those currently used today to group 
manned aircraft for the purpose of assigning airworthiness standards will be needed to 
adequately capture risks associated with UAS and their operations.   
Nomenclature 
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations 
CPA = Conventionally Piloted Aircraft 
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration 
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization 
NAS = National Airspace System 
UAS = Unmanned Aircraft System 
US = United States of America 
I. Introduction 
HE use of unmanned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) has been characterized as the next great 
step forward in the evolution of civil aviation. Despite significant progress made towards the goal of integrating 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the NAS1, numerous political, technological and regulatory challenges still 
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remain in realizing routine and safe operation of these aircraft2.  One aspect of the regulatory challenge is to 
establish the airworthiness standards for UAS.  Other organizations, especially militaries, have developed sets of 
airworthiness standards for their vehicles3.  Such standards are helpful, but may not adequately address risks 
associated with civil operation in the NAS, or adequately “accommodate the diversity of UAS design, capability, 
and operations”4 expected for commercial applications.  Indeed, as reported by Clothier, et al., “much effort is being 
devoted to the definition of standards specific to UAS (e.g., the specification of prescriptive requirements on aspects 
of their design, maintenance, manufacture and operation). However, little consideration has been given to how these 
standards and regulations may be appropriately applied across the diversity of UAS, their operations and the 
mitigation strategies widely employed.”5 
This paper examines the broad range of UAS by addressing one specific aspect of the airworthiness problem: 
namely, that of grouping similar UAS together for the purpose of assigning airworthiness standards, that is, UAS 
classification.  Specifically this paper examines the classification problem through the perspective of using physical 
characteristics of the aircraft and its operational capabilities and limitations to place it in a group wherein all 
members would be assigned the same airworthiness standards.  These characteristics and capabilities are referred to 
here as classification factors. This work leverages an initial survey of aircraft classification documented in 
Maddalon, et al.6  
Classification of aircraft for the purpose of assigning airworthiness standards should account for hazards and 
their associated risks, in addition to accounting for substantive differences in design features.  In this work, safety 
risk is the primary type of risk of interest, as opposed to other types of risk, such as economic risk or mission-
specific risk. The FAA defines safety risk as the composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential 
effect of a hazard that could cause harm to persons or property damage.7  Ideally, if safety risks inherent in different 
types of UAS and their operations could be identified, then UAS classification could be fashioned around these 
identified risks.  Although this is conceptually appealing, comprehensive risk identification across the spectrum of 
UAS has proven difficult. From a high-level perspective, DeGarmo made one of the best attempts2. 
Instead of attempting to identify all risks across all types of UAS, the research approach described in this paper 
involved examining airworthiness classification approaches from a wide variety of organizations, and then 
identifying and evaluating the various factors used in these approaches.  The classification system used for 
allocating airworthiness standards to civil manned aircraft by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was 
examined first, followed by a survey of proposed classification approaches for UAS. Presumably, each organization, 
whether military or civilian, classifies aircraft to address the risks that they deem most relevant to safety, and, 
consequently, the factors that correspond to the risks deemed most important to safety.  A basic hypothesis of this 
research is that the classification approach used for manned aircraft today is appropriate for UAS if the factors used 
to group manned aircraft are sufficient for grouping UAS for the purpose of assigning appropriate airworthiness 
standards.  If those factors do not adequately capture either distinct design attributes of UAS or operational aspects 
that warrant different standards, then other factors should be considered.  This analysis is both preliminary and 
subjective, especially due to the high degree of uncertainty in the specific hazards and risks associated with UAS 
operation in the NAS.  The intent of this work is to offer preliminary observations to help guide further 
investigation, rather than precise conclusions.  As additional hazard data is collected through increased operation of 
UAS, safety issues and risks can be better characterized and managed through appropriate classification.  
Because classification of UAS is a regulatory topic, this research relies heavily on interpretation of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations, denoted in the rest of the paper as 14CFRX.Y**.  This paper presents one view of the purpose 
and intent of the Federal Aviation Regulations with respect to airworthiness certification, and how those regulations 
may apply to UAS.  It is not intended to be a complete or expert treatment of the subject.  This paper should not be 
considered or used as an authoritative source for regulatory guidance, nor does it represent current or future US 
Government or FAA policy. 
Before proceeding, a note on terminology may be helpful.  Over the years, many terms have been used to 
describe unmanned aircraft; for example, drone, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), as well as unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS), which is the term this paper will use.  A UAS is any aircraft without a pilot on board, including 
associated control station, communication links and ancillary equipment.  Furthermore, this paper uses the term 
conventionally piloted aircraft or CPA8 to indicate an aircraft with a pilot on board. 
This report is organized as follows.  Section II outlines the scope of discussion on UAS classification and why 
classification of UAS is ultimately important to access to the NAS, and Section III defines terminology from the 
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regulations relevant to discussion of aircraft classification, and the fundamental structure and factors of the current 
aircraft classification for CPA.  Section IV follows with a list of various factors taken from a survey of proposed 
UAS classification systems, for both civil use and public use, including approaches in both the US and other 
countries.  Section V provides definitions for each factor.  Section VI provides an analysis of each factor as it relates 
to some aspect of the risk of UAS. 
II. Airworthiness Motivation for Aircraft Classification 
According to 14CFR3.5, airworthy means that an aircraft “conforms to its type design and is in a condition for 
safe operation.” One of the fundamental principles of Annex 8 of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Chicago Convention states that a purpose of airworthiness is the “protection of other aircraft, third parties 
and property.”9  In other words, a primary motivation for airworthiness is to preserve the safety of both participants 
and non-participants in the airspace. Airworthiness certification is one of several different certifications, required for 
an aircraft to operate legally in the NAS. 14CFR21 specifies the basic framework for civil certification procedures, 
including those for airworthiness, for aircraft products and parts in the United States. 
According to 14CFR21.203, every civil aircraft that operates in the US must have a valid airworthiness 
certificate; and that certificate is issued when, among other things, the aircraft conforms to an approved type design  
(14CFR21.183). Thus, for an aircraft to operate in the NAS it must have an airworthiness certificate. Airworthiness 
standards reflect general consensus on minimum design and performance requirements necessary for safe flight; and 
are derived from engineering judgment and experience, especially lessons learned from accidents and incidents. But, 
an airworthiness certificate is not enough; all aircraft that operate in the NAS must actually be in an airworthy 
condition (14CFR91.7). ICAO Circular 328 makes it clear that UAS will be required to be airworthy and have a 
valid airworthiness certificate.8 
Both standard and special airworthiness certifications exist for CPA. Under a standard airworthiness certificate, 
an aircraft typically has relatively few operating restrictions. Special airworthiness certificates include operational 
limitations such as restrictions on maneuvers, speed, number of passengers, activities undertaken, and where flights 
may be conducted. Clearly fewer operational restrictions are desired (from an operator's perspective); however, the 
cost of fewer operating restrictions is usually more stringent standards including levels of redundancy and fail-safe 
features to meet reliability requirements.  Most commercial CPA operations require a standard airworthiness 
certificate. Presumably, UAS could use the same two types of airworthiness certifications. 
The certification framework for CPA has evolved over time along with the aircraft industry itself, and is a 
contributing factor to the overall safety of the NAS.  Clothier, et al. observe, “A prerequisite to the realization of a 
viable civil UAS industry is the definition of an appropriate airworthiness certification framework for UAS. This 
framework must take into consideration the unique aspects of the technology, their operations, the market drivers, 
and the broader socio-political issues associated with the integration of a new aviation technology into society.”5 
Developing a regulatory system for UAS has proven to be quite challenging because the safety argument that 
underlies standards for CPA differs for unmanned aircraft in several fundamental aspects, including the separation 
of the aircraft itself from the pilot station, and the ability to see and avoid with the human eye.  These points are 
confounded by the extensive range of UAS types.   
A key issue related to the development of airworthiness standards for civil UAS, and a primary focus of this 
paper, is that of aircraft classification for airworthiness. Classification, as used in civil certification, partitions 
aircraft with their operation into groups for the purpose of assigning regulations, requirements, standards or other 
guidance to the aircraft within each group. Several motivations for classification are identified, including: 
1. Aircraft that pose different hazards require different standards 
2. Efficiencies through the use of standards, versus case-by-case 
3. Operational risk balancing 
4. Certification risk compensation 
Each of these motivations is described below along with its potential applicability to a UAS classification approach. 
Classification provides a means for grouping aircraft together with similar design, especially aerodynamic 
attributes, for example rotorcraft or fixed wing aircraft.  Since different groups of aircraft differ in meaningful ways, 
especially with respect to the hazards they pose to the NAS, different standards should be applied to them.  
Classification enables those differences to be recognized in a straight-forward manner.  Classification of UAS could 
proceed in a similar way: UAS accomplish critical functions in different ways that, perhaps, will be subject to 
different standards.  For example, the “sense and avoid” capability may be provided through an on-board system or 
it may be provided through a ground-based system.  Although the safety objective—to sense and avoid air traffic—
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is the same for either approach; the airworthiness standards may vary quite a bit depending on how the function is 
accomplished.  Conceivably, other differences can be handled in similar ways. 
There is a compelling practical effect of classification: efficiency in certification.  Classification allows the 
development of detailed standards which can be applied to different aircraft classes. 14CFR includes standards such 
as: specific design criteria (e.g., structural load limits), required design features (e.g., existence of fire extinguishers), 
and performance parameters (e.g., required ratios of rotation speed to minimum control speed).  An applicant for 
certification establishes their product's regulatory requirements in collaboration with the certification authority.  
These requirements are based on the existing standards and also include agreement on deviations from the standard 
to account for specific design elements of their aircraft.10  Benefits of standards-based certification include a priori 
knowledge of the expectations for certification, which facilitates planning from a design and cost perspective for 
certification, as well as providing a consistent and level playing field for all applicants.  The use of the pre-
established standards is not required, however.  An applicant could use the approach in 14CFR21.17b for a unique 
design.  This approach is much more labor-intensive for both the applicant and the certifying authority, with much 
more uncertainty in the outcome.  
Classification also supports operational risk balancing.  Many operations of CPA have critical safety risks, such 
as flight with passengers on board, flight over populated areas, etc. These operations require high assurance of safe 
conduct of flight and necessitate levels of redundancy and fail-safe features to meet reliability requirements.  Other 
operations that pose a lower safety risk are held to a lower standard. One means provided in 14CFR to perform this 
risk tradeoff is through certification under a restricted aircraft category, where the operation of a restricted category 
aircraft is limited to special purposes identified in their type certification approval.  This category is used for limited 
special purpose operations in manned aviation today, e.g., agricultural spraying and aerial surveying.  For UAS, this 
classification could be applied in a straightforward manner.  For instance, one can imagine that an agricultural UAS 
could fly under operational restrictions similar to conventionally piloted agricultural aircraft.   
Finally, classification supports risk reduction through the notion of certification compensation. The FAA issues 
publications, including advisory circulars, to provide guidance to industry on compliance with the requirements in 
14CFR.  Advisory Circular (AC) 23.1309 describes how certification standards are lowered for avionics for some 
general aviation airplanes.11  The assessment is made that low-time general aviation pilots have made mistakes that 
might have been prevented with advanced avionics, and therefore the avionics certification requirements (and 
associated costs) are lowered to encourage greater equipage.  Essentially, regulators concluded that the risk of a low-
time general aviation pilot making a mistake is greater than the risk of the avionics misbehaving. The operational 
risk is mitigated through acceptance of an airworthiness risk, and by this assessment overall system risk is lowered.  
Since all current UAS have no people on board, some have suggested that this certification compensation notion 
should apply to UAS as well.  This suggestion is controversial because the many differences that exist between 
conventionally piloted aircraft and UAS make it unclear how certification standards may be relaxed. 
III. Classification of CPA for Airworthiness in 14CFR 
The research investigation of possible classification of UAS for airworthiness started with an analysis of the 
existing certification framework for CPA.  The classification approach in 14CFR has evolved over several decades 
to accommodate the introduction of new aircraft types and as real-world issues—including technical, economic, and 
political issues—needed to be resolved.  For this effort, 14CFR was used as the primary source for defining the 
existing classification system and determining the underlying classification factors. 
The classification structure provided in 14CFR distinguishes between an aircraft's physical characteristics, called 
aircraft class, and an aircraft’s intended use or operating limits, called aircraft category. Specifically, as defined in 
14CFR1.1, aircraft class “means a broad grouping of aircraft having similar characteristics of propulsion, flight, or 
landing. Examples include: airplane; rotorcraft; glider; balloon; landplane; and seaplane.”  Also in 14CFR1.1, 
aircraft category “means a grouping of aircraft based upon intended use or operating limitations. Examples include: 
transport, normal, utility, acrobatic, limited, restricted, and provisional.”  14CFR does not specifically define the 
word classification. In this paper, the term classification means any grouping of aircraft and their operations, which 
is consistent with its use in the CFR. Type design criteria are typically applied to the class and category pair; for 
example, a fixed wing aircraft (airplane class) regularly transporting more than 50 passengers (transport category), 
commonly called a transport category airplane, has its type design criteria captured in 14CFR25 (i.e., “Part 25”). 
Of particular note, weight is a key factor in CPA classification.  This physical parameter can be viewed as a 
proxy for safety-related risk, that is, heavier aircraft pose a greater risk to occupants on board the aircraft and to 
others in the airspace and therefore have more stringent airworthiness standards. However, aircraft classification for 
airworthiness standards in 14CFR includes considerations beyond aircraft weight.  This section discusses some of 
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the most relevant considerations, as they may affect the inclusion of UAS within that framework.  A more extensive 
summary of the classification system in 14CFR is presented in a related technical report.6 
A. Aircraft Class 
14CFR1.1 lists the following examples of aircraft classes, based on flight, propulsion, and landing 
characteristics: airplane (i.e., fixed wing), rotorcraft, glider, balloon or manned free balloon, landplane, and 
seaplane. Determining whether an aircraft is in one of these classes is fairly straightforward.  For example, if an 
aircraft gets its aerodynamic lift from rotating blades, including gyroplanes, the aircraft is a rotorcraft.  For aircraft 
outside of these classes, such as a tilt-rotor, certification would be handled under the special provisions of 
14CFR21.17b.  Presumably, if the market for tilt-rotors grows and the FAA certifies several of them, then tilt-rotor 
could become an aircraft class with corresponding standards for that class of aircraft. 
Most UAS designs fit well within the aircraft classes listed above.  Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
(UVSI) provides an annual yearbook that catalogs UAS throughout the world from many domains including law 
enforcement, commercial, military, research, etc.  According to UVSI's 2012 yearbook, of the 1103 vehicles 
surveyed only 23 would not fit into one of the existing aircraft classes.12  Those that do not fit include novel 
configurations such as flapping wings or tilt body aircraft. 
B. Aircraft Category 
The aircraft categories in 14CFR, where the groupings are primarily based on similar use or operating 
limitations, are provided in Table 1.  This table shows the relationship among aircraft category, airworthiness 
certificates, and the possibility of performing the operation for “compensation or hire,” that is, to be paid for the 
operation. 
Table 1. Relationship of Airworthiness Certification  
and Use for Compensation to Aircraft Categories 
Category Airworthiness 
Certificate 
Compensation 
or Hire 
Normal Standard Yes 
Acrobatic Standard Yes 
Utility Standard Yes 
Commuter Standard Yes 
Transport Standard Yes 
Restricted Special Yes†† 
Primary Special No 
Limited‡‡ Special No 
Light-sport Special No 
Experimental Special No 
Provisional§§ Special No 
 
As seen in Table 1, most paid operations require a standard airworthiness certificate.  Under a standard 
airworthiness certificate, an aircraft typically has few operating restrictions, beyond the flight rules captured in 
14CFR91, 14CFR121, etc.  Special airworthiness certificates include operational limitations such as restrictions on 
maneuvers, speed, number of passengers, activities undertaken, and where flights may be conducted.  As per 
14CFR21.183, standard airworthiness certificates might also be issued to aircraft that are not in a category, 
specifically manned free balloons (14CFR31), or aircraft designated as special classes of aircraft (gliders, airships, 
etc.).   
The next step in understanding aircraft classification under 14CFR is to examine how the aircraft categories 
themselves are defined. Because the focus of this paper is on certification for civil operations, especially flights for 
compensation or hire, the discussion here focuses on categories that operate under a standard airworthiness 
certificate, and the restricted category for special purpose operations.  Table 2 relates aircraft categories to the 
                                                          
†† Only some operations are allowed for compensation, such as for agriculture or aerial surveying (14CFR21.25) 
‡‡ A short list of World War II era aircraft have limited category type certificates [FAA-8130.2G] 
§§ The provisional category is used during the development of an aircraft in some other category, but the vehicle in question has 
not met all the requirements for a type certificate and/or standard airworthiness certificate. 
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primary 14CFR part containing applicable airworthiness standards per aircraft class that would typically serve as the 
type certification basis under a standard airworthiness certificate or special airworthiness certificate-restricted 
category.  The third column presents the expected starting point for type design criteria.  This table is not intended to 
include everything in a typical certification basis, such as noise regulations specific to equipage for operational 
capabilities found in other parts of 14CFR.   
 
Table 2. Current Aircraft Category and Regulatory Basis Supporting Type Certification
6
 
Aircraft 
Category 
Aircraft Use and Notable Limitations Applicable Airworthiness 
Standards for Type Design 
Acrobatic Use:  acrobatics 
Notable limitations: 
weight ≤ 12,500 lbs. 
seats ≤ 9, excluding pilot seats, (14CFR23.3)  
14CFR23, with regulations 
specific to acrobatic category 
airplanes 
No acrobatic rotorcraft 
Normal Use:  flights that are not acrobatic, utility, or commuter 
Notable limitations:  
weight ≤ 12,500 lbs. (airplanes),  ≤ 7000 lbs. (rotorcraft) 
seats ≤ 9, excluding pilot seats (14CFR23.3) 
14CFR23 for airplanes 
14CFR27 for rotorcraft 
Utility Use:  normal + limited acrobatics allowed; e.g., spins 
(14CFR23.3) 
Notable limitations:  
weight ≤ 12,500 lbs.  
seats  ≤ 9, excluding pilot seats  
14CFR23 for airplanes  
No utility rotorcraft 
Commuter Use:  commuter operations (scheduled operation with at 
least 5 round trips/week on at least one route between two 
or more points according to the published flight schedules 
(14CFR110.2)) 
Notable limitations:  
weight ≤ 19,000 lbs. 
seats ≤ 19, excluding pilot seats (14CFR23.3) 
14CFR23 for airplanes 
No commuter rotorcraft 
Transport Use:  multi-engine aircraft intended for the regular public 
transport of passengers and/or cargo for hire or reward 
Notable limitations:  
weight: > 19,000 lbs. (jets & props), 7,000 lbs. (rotorcraft) 
seats ≥ 10 (jets), seats > 19 (props and rotorcraft)  
14CFR25 for airplanes 
14CFR29 for rotorcraft 
Restricted Use:  special purpose operations (as defined in 14CFR21.25, 
including agriculture and aerial surveying)  
Notable limitations: no operation over densely populated 
areas, in a congested airway, or near a busy airport 
(14CFR91.313) 
Requirements of some other 
category or an aircraft meeting the 
requirements and accepted for use 
by the US military with 
exemptions and operating 
limitations specific to the special 
purpose (14CFR21.25) 
 
As shown in this table, categories are defined in terms of aircraft weight, but also other factors such as number of 
seats, maneuverability (acrobatic maneuvers), number of engines, frequency of flights, and public transport of 
passengers or cargo.  It is not difficult to recognize how each of these factors affects risk to the people on-board 
those aircraft. 
Unlike the aircraft classes described in subsection A, the direct applicability to UAS of the aircraft categories 
and the factors used to distinguish them is debatable.  For example, the intended uses for UAS do not necessarily 
align as well with the existing set of aircraft categories. Although one can imagine transport category UAS for 
cargo, notions of normal, acrobatic, and utility category UAS are not so clear. Little, if any, data exists to show how 
factors such as maneuverability, number of engines, and number of scheduled operations affect risk for UAS. This 
observation points to a conclusion that the utility of applying the current classification system to UAS is unknown.  
From this, it seems reasonable to posit a modified or alternative classification system with additional aircraft 
categories and factors which enable the differentiation of risk between UAS platforms.  
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C. System Certification  
Partitioning of aircraft into groups in the current regulations does not end with a discussion of class and category.  
Requirements specified in other guidance documents, such as FAA Advisory Circulars, provide additional criteria 
for grouping aircraft with respect to one or more airworthiness requirements.  One particular requirement, 
14CFR23.1309, regulates equipment, systems, and installations on-board normal, acrobatic, utility, and commuter 
category airplanes. The accompanying advisory circular (AC23.1309-1E), System Safety Analysis and Assessment 
for Part 23 Airplanes11, which describes a means to meet the regulation, specifies four “certification classes of 
airplanes” within Part 23. This use of the term class has no relationship to the term described in subsection A.   
 
Table 3. Influence of Weight and Engines on Classification from AC23.1309-1E 
 Normal, Utility, or Acrobatic Category Commuter Category 
Class I Weight ≤ 6000 lbs. 
Single reciprocating engine 
N/A 
 
Class II Weight ≤ 6000 lbs. 
Either multiple reciprocating engine or a 
turbine engine 
N/A 
 
Class III Weight > 6000 lbs.  
Either a multiple reciprocating engine or 
a turbine engine 
N/A 
 
Class IV N/A 
  
Weight ≤ 19,000 lbs. 
19 or fewer seats 
 
AC23.1309-1E assigns specific reliability and design assurance requirements to each of these classes, which 
affects system design and development cost. The important point with respect to UAS classification is that both 
airplane weight, and number and type of engines are factors that ultimately affect how aircraft are grouped together 
with respect to type design criteria.   
Based on the data in Tables 2 and 3, Table 4 presents the primary factors that underlie the classification of CPA 
with respect to airworthiness standards.  
 
Table 4. Primary Airworthiness Classification Factors from 14CFR 
Weight 
Number and type of engines 
Maneuverability 
Number of passenger seats 
Scheduled operations 
Frequency of operations 
Motivation for use  
Responsible party  
 
IV. Survey of Classification Factors for Unmanned Aircraft 
In the last few years, many governmental, research, and private organizations throughout the world have 
examined the issue of UAS classification.  In a related technical report, an extensive survey of UAS classification 
approaches encompassing 22 organizations from 15 countries was conducted.6 The classification approaches 
identified in this survey are proposed or used in assigning regulations, requirements, standards or other guidance for 
UAS to operate in civil and public use environments.  Some organizations have classification approaches specific to 
airworthiness (that is, grouping together different UAS for the purpose of assigning airworthiness requirements), 
while other organizations have only specified operational limitations.  Still others propose some combination of the 
two.  As such, there are a variety of factors used for classifying UAS in each context.  It is notable that organizations 
in this survey did not explicitly mimic the approach in 14CFR; however, many organizations included both aircraft 
factors and operational factors, somewhat similar to the class/category approach in 14CFR. 
Table 5 provides a high-level summary of the classification factors identified from the various UAS 
classification approaches given in the survey.  As shown in the table, some organizations only use one factor 
whereas other organizations use two or three different aircraft or operational characteristics together to distinguish 
different groups of UAS.  
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Table 5. Pertinent Factors and Combinations for Potential Use in UAS Classification
6
 
Number of 
Factors 
Combinations of Classification Factors for UAS 
 
One 
Aircraft weight 
Avionics complexity 
Aircraft configuration: airplane (including number and type of 
engines), rotorcraft, etc. 
 
 
 
Two 
Aircraft weight, and Airspeed 
Aircraft weight, and Motivation for operation 
Aircraft weight, and Operational range 
Airspace (segregated, non-segregated), and Overflown area 
Kinetic energy, and Overflown area 
Kinetic energy, and Operational range 
Kinetic energy, and Operational failure consequence 
 
 
Three 
Aircraft weight, Altitude, and Operational range 
Aircraft weight, Airspeed, and Frangibility 
Aircraft weight, Kinetic energy, and Operational range 
Aircraft weight, Altitude, and Application 
Aircraft weight, Altitude, and Airspeed 
 
Although there are a number of different combinations of factors listed in Table 5, two observations are 
apparent.  First, aircraft weight, either directly or through kinetic energy (a combination of weight and speed), is the 
predominant factor influencing safety risk in UAS operations. Second, operational aspects are also considered an 
important driver for risk in many of the classifications.  These operational aspects are different from those shown in 
Table 2.  For example, operational factors that affect risk for UAS include if the operation is conducted within visual 
range or if the operation is over a populated area. This particular observation is important because such operational 
aspects are not always a factor in the existing classification for CPA. Aircraft weight is the dominant factor affecting 
risk for CPA operating under a standard airworthiness certificate—where the aircraft operates is inconsequential 
from a risk perspective compared with the risk to the people on-board.  This is reflected in the fact that normal, 
acrobatic, utility, commuter, and transport aircraft are not distinguished by where they fly, but largely by weight. 
Generally speaking, heavier aircraft allow more people to be carried, and thus must meet more stringent reliability 
requirements.  Under a special airworthiness certificate-restricted category, where the aircraft operates is an 
important factor.  Because operation of those aircraft is in a limited operational area, operational restrictions can 
compensate for not meeting all airworthiness standards expected under a standard certificate.  The fact that many of 
the proposed UAS classification approaches include operational dimensions may suggest that further exploration of 
operation under a restricted category is warranted.   
V. Candidate Factors for UAS Classification 
In this section classification factors identified from three sources (the existing classification system for CPA 
provided in the CFR, a survey of UAS classification factors6, and additional factors that the authors of this paper 
consider worthy of consideration) are more formally described to support analysis of how each factor may, or may 
not, influence the classification of UAS.  The source documents for these factors did not typically include a detailed 
explanation for each factor.  So, as part of the elaboration process, an explanation and description of the factor is 
proposed to cover both the assumed intent from the original source document, plus additional considerations from 
the wider UAS design space.  The factors considered in this analysis are summarized in Table 6 along two 
dimensions, first by the aggregate source of where the factor was identified and second by how the factor will be 
established: primarily by the design of the aircraft or by the operation of the aircraft.   
A short description of each factor is provided below. Not all factor descriptions are equal; that is, some are 
technical, some socio-technical; and some are simple, and some are very complex.  For factors used for CPA 
classification, the description includes a high-level analysis of the applicability of each factor to UAS. The aircraft 
factors are described first, followed by the operational factors. 
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Table 6. Summary of All Candidate Factors for UAS Classification 
 Aircraft Factors Operational Factors 
Factors identified 
from the existing 
CPA classification 
framework in 
14CFR 
Weight 
Number and type of engines 
Maneuverability 
Number of passenger seats 
Scheduled operations 
Frequency of operations 
Motivation for use  
Responsible party  
Factors identified 
from the survey of 
UAS 
classifications 
 
Avionics complexity  
Airspeed  
Kinetic energy  
Operational range  
Frangibility 
Operational area 
Overflown area 
Operational failure consequence 
Altitude 
Additional Factors Cost Flight time 
 
Weight 
 
The maximum takeoff weight is the maximum weight the pilot of the aircraft is allowed to attempt to take off 
due to structural or other limits. 14CFR recognizes that weight has both static and dynamic interactions with the 
aircraft structure and directly and indirectly influences controllability and performance characteristics to help 
maintain safety of flight. Generally speaking, heavier aircraft carry more people (or more cargo) and any adverse 
event on the aircraft will have a greater severity. In that sense, weight correlates positively with safety risk, 
particularly with respect to hazard severity. As such, weight is the primary factor used in defining a number of 
distinctions in aircraft classification, such as commuter category from transport, normal/utility/acrobatic from 
commuter, and Class I & II from AC23.1309 from Class III.  Due to lightweight materials and advances in 
technology, the FAA Part 23 Small Airplane Certification Process Study13 argues that original weight assumptions 
(and inferred risks) are no longer valid differentiators for determining airworthiness requirements. This observation 
from the Part 23 study may also apply to UAS designs.  
 
Number and type of engines and propellers 
 
14CFR23 distinguishes aircraft performance, stability, and controllability requirements based on the number of 
engines along with their type, either piston or turbine, usually in combination with other factors, such as weight.  In 
a similar way, AC23.1309-1E partitions aircraft partially based on the number and type of engines and assigns 
reliability and design assurance requirements based on this partitioning.  This factor could be used in similar ways 
for UAS; however, the wide range of UAS designs and operational needs may stress this factor in new ways.  For 
instance, many UAS will be electrically driven, possibly with solar power or fuel cells as sources for electrical 
power, whereas other UAS may use hydrogen power sources. “Multi-engine” for a UAS could mean 10 or more 
engines in some long endurance designs. 
 
Maneuverability  
 
Maneuverability is an amalgam of a number of performance parameters including performance, controllability, 
stability, trim, stall, and spin characteristics.  In 14CFR23, maneuverability, as it relates to structural loading and 
spin characteristics, is used partly to distinguish between the normal, utility, and acrobatic categories.  While 
maneuverability is not used to otherwise partition aircraft, the requirements for maneuverability may differ in groups 
partitioned by other factors, such as weight, altitude, speed, or number/type of engines. It is reasonable to assume 
that UAS will need to maintain some minimum level of maneuverability; however it is unclear whether the current 
maneuverability specifications for normal, utility, and acrobatic aircraft are appropriate for UAS or whether 
maneuverability requirements should be used to partition UAS for other reasons, such as the ability to meet 
minimum standards to avoid other air traffic.  
 
Number of passenger seats 
 
The number of passenger seats is a proxy for the potential number of people on board an aircraft.  It can be 
inferred that as the number of passenger seats (and hence passengers) increase, overall safety risk increases, and 
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hence more stringent airworthiness requirements must be satisfied to mitigate that risk.  In some ways this factor is 
closely related to the weight factor since as more passengers are carried, more weight is carried. Because the number 
of passenger seats would only be relevant to a UAS that has passengers, this factor is not currently applicable to 
UAS since passenger-carrying UAS are only considered for the far-term.  
 
Avionics complexity  
 
Complexity is a topic of frequent discussion in the avionics community, and particularly difficult to precisely 
define.  For this study, an avionics system is considered complex “when its operation, failure modes, or failure 
effects are difficult to comprehend without the aid of analytical methods or structured assessment methods.”11 
Examples of structured assessment methods include Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis.  
According to the definition above, a complex system is one in which its behavior, especially in fault scenarios, is not 
apparent. This lack of transparency may lead to concerns about unintended or unpredicted behavior, and 
consequently may require more stringent reliability and design assurance levels to mitigate that risk.  The factor may 
not be straightforward to apply to UAS.   
 
Airspeed  
 
Airspeed is the velocity of an aircraft relative to the air mass through which it is flying. Airspeed operating 
limitations revolve around flying at the velocity that results in the desired performance to ensure safe flight. In 
general, violations to airspeed limitations would impede safe landings for CPA.  Airspeed limitations minimize 
impact to other airborne objects and to people/property on the ground. Airspeed is not one of the factors identified 
for partitioning CPA, but was used in some UAS classifications found in the survey.  Airspeed affects UAS 
operations in a similar way to existing manned operations. However, design considerations with respect to UAS 
airspeed may be substantially different from CPA and thus require different minimum design standards, considering 
the expanded operating envelop for many UAS.  
 
Kinetic energy  
 
Kinetic energy is a factor unique to some of the UAS classifications in the survey.  Kinetic energy is defined as 
the product of an aircraft’s maximum mass (m), one half, and the square of its maximum speed (v), i.e., ½ mv2. 
Because kinetic energy can be viewed as the work which is required to stop a body in motion, kinetic energy is a 
proxy for the amount of damage that can be inflicted on impact. So, kinetic energy is important to safety risk for 
UAS, in the sense that safety is interested in potential harm to persons, as well as to property. 
 
Operational range  
 
Operational range is defined as the distance between the control station and the aircraft.  This factor is unique to 
UAS.  Operational range may be expressed numerically as a distance or qualitatively as “Line-of-Sight” or “Beyond 
Line-of-Sight.” ICAO Circular 328 further distinguishes between visual line-of-sight and radio line-of-sight.8 The 
distinction between visual and radio points to two distinct hazards: visual line-of-sight operations allow a human to 
provide “see and avoid” capability and radio line-of-sight recognizes a UAS may lose radio contact and potentially 
becoming uncontrolled by any human. A UAS with a beyond-radio-line-of-sight capability will have a complicated 
communication system (perhaps involving satellites or multiple ground-based communication relays) or it will be 
capable of full operation without human intervention (i.e., autonomous operation). 
 
Frangibility 
 
Frangibility means to break into pieces or the nature of breaking into pieces in order to mitigate the 
consequences of collision or impact. This factor, like operational range, is unique to UAS. Frangibility relates to the 
ability of a material or structure to absorb energy thus minimizing injury. In general, frangibility implies the 
consequence (severity) of a collision between a UAS and another aircraft or person/property can be reduced due to 
the frangibility of all or part of the UAS component or design. Some organizations consider that a frangible UAS 
may proceed with a lower level of robustness due to its lower risk to people and other aircraft.  
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Scheduled operations 
 
In 14CFR110.2, a scheduled operation is defined as “any common carriage passenger-carrying operation for 
compensation or hire conducted by an air carrier or commercial operator for which the certificate holder or its 
representative offers in advance the departure location, departure time, and arrival location. It does not include any 
passenger-carrying operation that is conducted as a public charter operation.” Key points relevant to classification 
are that a scheduled operation is passenger carrying, for compensation/hire, by a certificate holder (i.e., air carrier), 
with advance knowledge of schedule/location.  This factor, coupled with frequency of operations, contributes to the 
partitioning of commuter category from normal flying from an operational perspective.  By itself, the fact that an 
operation is scheduled does not seem to have a significant effect on airworthiness standards, especially reliability 
and design assurance requirements. There are two challenges with this factor as applied to UAS. First, near-term 
UAS will not carry passengers and second, it is not clear if the business case for UAS will typically involve 
published schedule information.  Leaving aside these issues, a UAS performing a scheduled operation may present a 
similar risk to a CPA performing a scheduled operation.  
 
Frequency of operations 
 
Frequency of operations is simply the number of times that an aircraft completes its intended operation, often 
measured on a weekly basis.  For example, commuter operations are defined as operations of at least five round trips 
per week. A key point is that this factor accounts in some sense for the risk of an accident on takeoff and landing.  A 
manned aircraft is more likely to crash on takeoff and landing, than in any other phase of flight; so, the more 
frequent the operations, the higher the standards. For UAS, it is not clear that takeoff and landing necessarily 
represent the most risky phases of flight.  Loss of control, which is a significant hazard for UAS, may be more 
prevalent during en-route or loitering phases of flight.   
 
Motivation for use  
 
Motivation for use is a factor that describes, at varying levels, the purpose of operating an aircraft.  To a large 
extent, this factor distinguishes between private use (e.g., recreation) and operation of the aircraft for compensation 
for CPA. It should be noted that not all operations by a company are considered compensated operations.  Generally, 
if a flight operation is incidental to the business, then it is considered a private operation.  Private versus 
compensated use is not the only distinction in CPA classification, though.  14CFR21.25 lists a number of specific 
special purpose operations that can be conducted for compensation under a special airworthiness certificate—
restricted category, including  agricultural (spraying, dusting, seeding, and livestock and predatory animal control); 
forest and wildlife conservation; aerial surveying (photography, mapping, and oil and mineral exploration); 
patrolling (pipe lines, power lines, and canals); weather control (cloud seeding); and aerial advertising (skywriting, 
banner towing, airborne signs, and public address systems).  Overall, motivation for use affects airworthiness 
standards for CPA in the sense that standards are higher when the motivation for use is compensation or hire, versus 
personal or recreational use. Operation under a restricted category for compensation may allow for some standards 
to be relaxed in lieu of operational limitations.  The same reasoning seems generally applicable to UAS.  
 
Responsible party  
 
The responsible party is the person or organization responsible for the safe operation of the flight. In some ways 
this is a further refinement of commercial operation.  A primary distinction with respect to regulation is whether the 
operator is a commercial operating certificate holder, who is allowed to operate an aircraft for compensation or hire. 
With respect to classification, this factor is similar to motivation for use (see above) with respect to whether the 
benefit of the flight is personal or private versus commercial transportation (for compensation or not).  Generally 
speaking, airworthiness standards are higher when services are compensated, versus when they are not (volunteer, 
personal/corporate use). The same reasoning seems generally applicable to UAS. 
 
Operational area  
 
Operational area groups UAS based on the type of airspace where these UAS normally conduct their operation.  
In its most basic form, the airspace types include areas where only UAS are allowed (i.e., “segregated”) and areas 
where UAS mix with CPA (i.e., “non-segregated”).  One can envision this factor using finer distinctions of airspace 
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types, such as the airspace classes A, B, C, etc. Operational area is not used for partitioning CPA, but can be used to 
limit operations for restricted-category certifications or other purposes (e.g., temporary flight restrictions). To the 
extent that the operational area factor relates to the exposure, duration, or consequences of risk to other parties (in 
the air or on the ground) it may be a good proxy for risk. This factor does not represent a restriction on airspace 
usage for UAS.  Rather, it defines categories with more and less stringent airworthiness standards. 
 
Overflown area 
 
Similar to operational area, overflown area partitions UAS based on, nominally, what is underneath them when 
they conduct their normal operation.  The overflown area is typically categorized based on some notion of 
population density.  At its most basic level, the categories are populated and unpopulated.  This factor is not used for 
partitioning CPA, although it may be a good proxy for risk to humans and/or objects on the ground in that it relates 
directly to consequences, exposure, and duration of risks.  In that sense, overflown area may be an important factor 
for UAS classification.  Like operational area, this factor does not represent a restriction on the areas overflown by a 
UAS.  Rather, it defines categories with more and less stringent airworthiness standards. 
 
Operational failure consequence 
 
Operational failure consequence attempts to capture the notion that eventually a UAS will have a failure and this 
failure may have significant consequences. Many other factors use a generalized notion of avoiding hazards; this 
factor identifies the hazards to be addressed. In particular, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) partitions 
UAS for certification purposes relative to two specific hazards14: (1) loss of thrust leading to impact with the ground, 
i.e., “unpremeditated descent;” and (2) loss of control, under powered flight, resulting in impact with the ground.  To 
assign consequence, EASA uses the aircraft’s associated kinetic energy associated with those two events to assign 
airworthiness requirements. 
 
Altitude  
 
Altitude is used in two slightly different ways in various UAS classification schemes: as the maximum altitude 
for a UAS operation, and as the normal operating altitude for the UAS. There are multiple ways that altitude is used 
in 14CFR, including height above mean sea level, height above the terrain, pressure altitude, and cabin pressure 
altitude.  Cabin pressure altitude is irrelevant to a UAS without people on board. For UAS, altitude could be used in 
a number of ways. For example, small UAS may be restricted to operate below 400 feet, which provides segregation 
from other air traffic, since 14CFR91.119 states that aircraft should fly at least 500 feet above any obstructions in 
uncongested areas (1000 feet in congested areas).  In addition altitude could be used to ensure that UAS do not enter 
class A airspace.  Finally, another way that altitude could be used in classification is the notion of danger to the 
ground.  If a vehicle is high in the air, and loses control from the pilot, then the vehicle may glide a long way 
(perhaps 100’s of miles) before it hits the ground.  This distance may be outside of operating restrictions.  For 
instance, a vehicle operating over cornfields at a high altitude, in such a failure condition, could fly to a city. 
 
Flight time 
 
Flight time is the maximum time the aircraft can stay aloft without an operational intervention, such as refueling.  
This factor tries to capture a notion of endurance, that is, how long a UAS can fly “on its own.” Since UAS 
platforms need not land and take off with the frequency dictated by piloted vehicles (as pilots can remain in the air 
no longer than the times specified in 14CFR91.1057, 14CFR91.1059-1062), maximum flight time performs a 
similar function as frequency of flights might in a commercial airline operation. 
 
Aircraft cost 
 
The use of aircraft cost has no precedent in the regulation or classification of CPA.  As such, its use may be 
controversial; although this factor is proposed because it captures a unique aspect of risk: the risk borne by a UAS’s 
owners.  Such costs are not traditionally the concern of regulatory authorities.  But, cost is worth mentioning here 
because aircraft cost can greatly influence the strategies employed for aircraft design for potential loss events. If the 
aircraft is designed to be retrieved after a mission, loss of control mitigation strategies will attempt to mitigate first, 
second and third party risk. If the aircraft is not reusable, then only second and third party risk need be considered in 
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mitigation strategies. As the cost of the aircraft increases in relationship to the limited liability the aircraft incurs 
with respect to second and third parties, the mitigation strategies will shift to preserving aircraft integrity over 
preventing overall damage caused to other parties. Thus, if an aircraft is designed to be deployed in unpopulated 
areas, secondary and third party risks may be minimal compared to cost incurred by the loss of the aircraft or its 
mission data.  
Several definitions of aircraft cost may be used including: capital asset value and revenue generation value.  
Capital asset value may be its current value (purchase price minus depreciation) or may be its initial value.  The 
revenue generation value recognizes that if the aircraft is lost, the owner may have to forego revenue until a 
replacement can be fielded.  Each of these costs has significant issues that must be addressed such as is the ground 
station included in the cost, accounting issues, time value of money, etc. 
VI. Analysis of Factors 
Analysis of these factors proceeds with assessing how each factor relates to different aspects of safety risk of 
UAS. Although this analysis is qualitative and arguably speculative, it provides useful general insights. This analysis 
considers four aspects relevant to safety risk: likelihood and severity (the conventional components of safety risk), 
and also duration and expectation.  Likelihood refers to the probability that a hazardous event will happen; the 
higher the likelihood, the higher the risk, assuming all other factors are equal.  Severity refers to how bad the 
consequence of a safety event might be; the more severe the effect of an event, the higher the risk, assuming the 
same likelihood.  Duration refers to the length of time during which a hazardous event could occur.  In general, 
shorter duration times are desirable. Although duration may be captured as part of likelihood, duration was 
considered explicitly in this analysis because time associated with some UAS operations, and hence exposure time 
for hazards and risk, is significantly different from CPA. Finally, expectation refers to a notion of a relative level of 
acceptable risk. For example, in manned aviation, compensated operations have a higher expectation of safety than 
private or personal operations. This expectation, though subtle, may influence severity, and may be different 
potentially between CPA and UAS. 
The candidate factors for UAS classification were examined in two groups: those factors that are currently used 
in 14CFR for CPA, followed by those factors proposed for UAS, as identified in Table 6.  The rationale follows the 
original hypothesis for this work.  That is, if the factors used in the current aircraft class/aircraft category 
classification for CPA are reasonable and sufficient for UAS, then those factors should serve as a reasonable starting 
point for UAS classification.  However, if those factors do not adequately capture either distinct design attributes of 
UAS or operational aspects that warrant different standards, then other factors should be considered.  As noted in the 
previous section, additional factors beyond those in the CFR have been proposed by various organization to capture 
a different aspect of risk that is more significant in unmanned aviation. This set provides a good starting point, if 
additional classification factors seem warranted for UAS. 
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis of the factors that were identified in 14CFR for CPA classification.  
This analysis was a 2-step process: first determining which of the four aspects of risk (likelihood, severity, duration, 
and expectation) is most qualitatively affected by a perturbation of each factor (all others being held equal) for CPA 
operations in the NAS, and second by assessing whether a reasoned argument could be formed to justify the 
conclusion that the factor would have similar or different effects on the components of risk of UAS operation in the 
NAS.  As shown in this table, many factors affect the same aspect of risk in both manned and unmanned aircraft. 
The obvious example is that as weight increases, safety risk increases in both manned and unmanned aircraft, 
assuming all other factors being equal. Thus, such factors could be used to partition UAS in the same way as they 
are used presently.   
On the other hand, and more importantly, differences in the table point to potential factors for CPA classification 
that may not be applicable or relevant in the same respects.  Those differences lend support to refuting the 
hypothesis that the current classification system is suitable for UAS.  Number of passenger seats, for example, 
obviously does not apply to UAS at the present time, since passenger-carrying UAS are a far term application. When 
such passenger-carrying UAS are proposed, the number of passenger seats will be a significant classification factor.  
Factors that affect risk differently may require modification in how they are used for unmanned aviation.  For 
instance, multiple engines are common in both CPA and unmanned aircraft.  However, the variation in UAS designs 
(e.g., quadcopters) is much more extensive than for CPA. In addition, some UAS have very different engine types 
(e.g., solar-electric) to meet unique mission requirements (e.g., mission times on the order of days).  Those UAS 
may operate quite differently than manned aircraft with multiple engines, and hence require different minimum 
design standards.   
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Another difference highlighted in the table is maneuverability.  It is quite difficult to confidently assess whether 
maneuverability is needed to distinguish different groups of UAS.  Maneuverability is used to distinguish between 
the normal, utility, and acrobatic categories in manned aviation.  Maneuverability will be critical for UAS to 
accomplish avoidance and recovery maneuvers.  For UAS, it is not obvious what normal flying might mean, and 
whether there will be a need for different structural capabilities in UAS to support acrobatic maneuvers.  This factor 
may have significant unknowns until the UAS industry fully matures and the certification community can develop 
correlations between maneuverability and usage.  Finally, the motivation for use factor may have a different effect 
for CPA than for UAS.  For a CPA, compensated operations are held to a higher standard.  There is an expectation 
that compensated aviation services operate in a rigorous, professional manner, consistent with the higher standard. 
Compensated operations may still be significant in unmanned aviation, though in a different way. Assuming UAS 
operation mix is similar to CPA, compensated operations will be more common than uncompensated ones, so to 
keep the total number of adverse events down, the likelihood must be controlled.  
 
Table 7. Differences in Effect on Risk of Airworthiness Classification Factors from 14CFR 
Airworthiness Classification 
Factors from 14CFR 
Primary Aspect of Risk Affected by each Factor 
For CPA For UAS 
Weight Severity Severity 
Number and type of engines Likelihood Likelihood with 
significant unknowns 
Maneuverability Likelihood Unknown 
Number of passenger seats Severity Not applicable 
Scheduled operations Likelihood Likelihood 
Frequency of operations Likelihood Likelihood 
Motivation for use  Expectation Likelihood 
Responsible party Expectation Expectation 
 
Overall, it seems reasonable to postulate that the primary factors from 14CFR (except for number of passenger 
seats) may affect UAS classification for design standards, but not exactly in the same way as CPA. That is, most of 
the airworthiness classification factors from 14CFR are still useful, but probably in different ways.  It  is not 
surprising then that a large number of organizations6 have developed classification approaches that do not rely solely 
on the existing regulations for CPA. As such, it seems reasonable to explore other factors that have been proposed 
for UAS classification.   
Table 8 presents a cursory analysis of UAS-specific classification factors culled from the survey. Clearly each 
factor was deemed relevant to UAS classification from at least one organization. This analysis, consequently, simply 
consists of an initial assessment of each factor, considered individually, in three areas: the aspect of risk affected by 
this factor (comparable to Table 7), benefits of this factor with regard to UAS airworthiness classification, and 
potential issues with each factor. As shown in Table 8, the potential benefit for many of the factors reflects the wider 
range of design diversity in UAS than CPA. Different airworthiness standards may be needed to account for 
different design aspects that support that range. For example, a highly frangible UAS may have very different 
requirements with respect to structures and materials than one that is not intended to be frangible.  Other factors, like 
operational area and overflown area, account for hazards to people and property in a way that is not necessary for 
any aircraft with a human on-board. Those factors might be considered in operational limitations that could partition 
UAS into categories different from CPA.  Cost, albeit an unconventional factor, strongly correlates with quality 
aspects of a UAS that affect safety risk (e.g., structural integrity and reliability) perhaps more directly so than for 
CPA. 
The potential issues largely come in three forms: clarity, agreement, and enforceability—characteristics 
important to a useable classification scheme.  Clarity issues reflect the fact that some concepts are easy to give a 
name to, but establishing an objective, general, universal definition of the concept is very difficult.  For instance, 
there is a means to determine avionics complexity in the advisory circular11 for 23CFR1309.  However, the authors 
of this definition recognize that “experienced engineering and operational judgment” is needed to determine if a 
system is complex. In essence, there is currently no objective definition of complexity. To resolve clarity issues 
further research regarding the factor should be expected.  An issue of agreement is one where the UAS community 
generally understands the factor, although the precise definition has not been established.  Since these definitions 
may have business implications and larger societal concerns, the appropriate way to resolve these issues will likely 
involve public hearings and industry-consensus standards processes (e.g., RTCA subcommittees).  Finally, the 
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notion of enforceability is considered.  These are issues where the regulatory body would need to provide some level 
of continuing enforcement that the aircraft does not violate the terms of their certification regarding the 
classification factor.  To be clear, issues suggested in Table 8 should not be taken to mean that these factors are not 
viable.  Instead, these issues should be considered if the Table 8 factors are used to discriminate between groups of 
UAS in any classification approach. 
 
Table 8. Analysis of UAS-Specific Classification Factors  
 Primary Aspect of Risk 
Affected by the Factor 
Potential Benefits of Factor 
for Classification 
Potential Issues with the 
Factor 
Avionics 
Complexity  
Likelihood May account for increased 
dependence on safety-critical 
avionics  
Clarity in defining complex 
Airspeed  Severity May account for expanded 
design space for UAS   
Requires agreement in 
maximum airspeed definition 
Kinetic Energy Severity May account for the amount of 
damage that can be inflicted 
upon people or other property 
on impact 
Requires agreement in 
maximum speed definition 
Operational 
Range (visual) 
Likelihood  May account for new hazards 
related to using ground 
observers 
Enforceability concerns; 
Clarity in defining loss of 
visual contact by occlusions 
Operational 
Range (radio) 
Likelihood May account for new hazards 
from using radio control links 
Enforceability concerns  
Frangibility Severity May allow reduced accident 
severity through frangible 
structures that would be 
unacceptable for CPA 
Clarity in defining 
frangibility 
Operational 
Area  
Likelihood May account for hazards 
specific to airspace 
participants 
Enforceability concerns 
Overflown Area Severity May account for hazards to 
people and property on the 
ground 
Enforceability concerns; 
Clarity in defining lightly 
inhabited areas 
Operational 
Failure 
Consequence 
Severity May account for new hazards 
and risk assessment unique to 
UAS 
Clarity in elaborating 
relevant failures 
Altitude  Likelihood May account for potential  
design differences for UAS 
propulsion or structural aspects 
relevant to flying at altitudes 
different from CPA 
Enforceability concerns 
Flight Time Duration May account for new hazards 
related to substantially 
different mission times (longer 
or shorter) for UAS 
Requires agreement in 
definition of flight time 
Aircraft Cost Severity May account for the quality of 
a UAS, in a way that is not 
necessary for CPA, since 
existing regulations for safety 
guarantee a level of quality. 
Clarity in defining aircraft 
cost; Unprecedented use of 
cost in 14CFR  
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.                           
- William Shakespeare in Hamlet 
 
As Hamlet admonishes his friend about having a perspective that is too simple to account for the complexities of 
life, this work indicates that there may be both physical aircraft and operational attributes, not considered for 
manned aircraft, that warrant consideration when contemplating how airworthiness standards are to be allocated to 
UAS. This allocation of standards to a group of UAS is referred to as UAS classification.  This research examined 
the hypothesis that the classification approach used for manned aircraft today is appropriate for UAS if the factors 
used to group manned aircraft are sufficient for grouping UAS for the purpose of assigning appropriate 
airworthiness standards.  If those factors do not adequately capture either distinct design attributes of UAS or 
operational aspects that merit different standards, then other factors should be considered.  
A study of 14CFR shows that the conventional classes of aircraft, such as airplanes (i.e., fixed wing), rotorcraft, 
and balloons, align quite well with the vast majority of types of UAS currently under consideration.  Conventional 
aircraft categories and subcategories may not align as well, based on an analysis of the factors that form the basis for 
those categories.  Twenty candidate factors were identified that may have some effect on how aircraft with similar 
design and operational characteristics could be grouped together.  Each factor is described and analyzed.  Aircraft 
weight is a common dimension used in classification, although weight is rarely used exclusively.  From a survey of 
UAS classification approaches in a related technical report6, most notional classification systems include operational 
dimensions to their classification system, such as the intended operational area.  The analysis in this paper shows 
that many of the UAS-specific factors capture different risks than those factors from 14CFR, albeit with significant 
issues to be resolved. If these issues are resolved, then those factors may be useful in extending the existing 
classification system to accommodate UAS.  However, until these issues are resolved, an incremental step towards 
the introduction of UAS may be to include some operational limitations to a UAS certification basis.  This approach 
is analogous to a “restricted category” airworthiness certificate for CPA.  
This paper presents a small step in advancing the cause of UAS classification for airworthiness.  Many more 
research steps must be taken before a sound, scientifically informed decision may be made regarding UAS 
classification.  Some steps include a comprehensive analysis of the individual factors, as well as analysis of the 
factors in combination, to better understand how they may characterize hazards and risks for UAS.   
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